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Beyond Judicial Activism and Restraint
RICHARD

A.

EPSTEIN*

The third question that the editors of the Georgetown Journal of Law & Public
Policy have posed to their contributors asks whether conservative intellectuals
(broadly conceived, I hope, to include libertarians as well as social conservatives) are hoisted by their own petard by embracing judicial activism for their
own pet causes after denouncing its use by more liberal justices and scholars for
a different set of causes. In order to unpack this multi-part question, it is important to
set the appropriate frame of debate. One possible response is to assume that
"liberal" activism is wrong, so that conservative activism becomes no better. Both
sides engage in selective forms of judicial intervention. A second line of argument
assumes that liberal judicial activism is on some points correct. Under this view,
conservatives (especially the more libertarian among them) regard any asserted
contradiction as more apparent than real. They think that the only question is
whether any given interpretation, be it broad or narrow, is consistent with the
text and structure of the Constitution. All things considered, I believe that the
second approach has more traction than the first. We learn little from recrimination across the legal divide. We learn much more by seeking a sound approach
to judicial interpretation generally, letting the chips fall where they may.
In dealing with constitutional interpretation, it is important to avoid the
tyranny of presumptions, which as an abstract matter are often used to define
the judicial role. All too often these discussions of judicial activism begin with
global accounts of the limitations and the strengths of the judicial role relative
to those of its main competitor in law-making, the legislature. It is often said
against the judiciary that it cannot take and assimilate evidence by experts and
ordinary citizens, and that it is ill-equipped to pass on the strengths and
weaknesses of our social institutions. Owing to these limitations, it should not
attempt to second-guess results that are supported by both popular sentiment
and specialized knowledge. In response, it is said that legislatures (and the
administrative agencies that they create) are often so rent with faction that much
of what passes for popular sentiment and specialized knowledge is little more
than pretext for indefensible political longings. The resulting class legislation
merely shifts wealth and opportunity from one side of the ledger to another by
political might and intrigue and bears little if any relationship to the advancement of the general welfare.' Any critique of the judicial role that ignores either
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chicago; Peter and
Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution.
1. For discussion of this general theme, see, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE
RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWER JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1993) (noting the importance of this

theme in the nineteenth century police power jurisprudence that preceded Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45 (1905)).
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of these competing concerns is so blinded as to offer little or no guidance as to
how judges ought to behave. We have had legislation that does well by these
dual measures, and we have had legislation that has done miserably by the same
standards. The question we have to answer is how to distinguish between them
without doing violence to the constitutional text or the judicial role.
Whether interpreting a contract, a statute, or a constitution, my own view of
textual interpretation does not vary much. In each case I start with the presumption that language is a tool of incredible sophistication which, when properly
used, conveys information with matchless efficiency. In ordinary life, when we
pay far less attention to words than we do in formal legal documents, people
communicate with great rapidity and accuracy. We could not build, let alone fly,
airplanes unless the precision of scientific language carried over in large measure to the business of our daily lives. I do not think that we lose that power of
communication when we choose to set down in specific language our thoughts
about social rules and practices. Rather, our challenge is to take ordinary
language and to use it in a way that not only articulates a decision in the here
and now, but also to frame general rules that apply to circumstances, some of
which are foreseen and understood and some of which are not. We face
therefore the familiar choice between language that is specific in the domain
that it covers, so as to eliminate uncertainty in its application, but unable to keep
pace with changes in events, or language that is general in application, but
uncertain in its application to particular cases.
The simple truth of the matter is that neither strategy dominates the other
across the board. In some situations we choose bright-line rules, such as one
that requires a President to be thirty-five years of age on taking office. In other
cases, we choose broader language that is closely tied to our political and
intellectual heritage. The Due Process Clauses of the Constitution, for example,
speak of the protection of "life, liberty and property, ' ' 2 which seems to echo the
Lockean injunction that the purpose of the state is to protect all individuals in
their "lives, liberties and estates. '' 3 The first principle of good statutory interpretation is to identify which clauses have adopted which approach, and then to
apply the canons suitable to the ambitions of the provision. It would strike me
as odd in the extreme, for example, to insist that one could find all sorts of
exceptions and qualifications to the requirement that the President be thirty-five
years of age. There are a large number of individuals who are eligible to hold
that office, so it would be peculiar to find an implied waiver of that provision
for, say, the son of a former President or current army general. We may hold the
(now obsolete) view of my generation of graying Berkeley activists who "never
trust anyone over thirty," but that objection is most decidedly one of policy,

2. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
3. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 66 (C.B. Macpherson ed., Hackett Publishing
1980) (1690).
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which recognizes the clarity of the 35-year minimum age limit on the one hand
even as it denounces its wisdom on the other.
Other provisions of the Constitution, however, do not admit that rifle-like
precision. Once a command becomes general in nature, it then becomes much
more important to have rules of interpretation that recognize the built-in dangers
of over- and under-extension that influence its correct interpretation. In order to
see how this parallelism works, it is useful to take two broad commands of the
Constitution that, in my view, should be read in tandem. One of these, the First
Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech, provides, "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech." 4 The Fifth Amendment admonishes,
... nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."5 Both of these clauses cry out for some degree of interpretation consistent
with the twin imperatives set out above. They are designed to make sure that
Congress does not go off the rails in the regulation of either speech or property;
yet they must be read to allow legislation that may abridge some speech or may
take some property value in exchange for a greater common good. How might
these dual tasks be undertaken?
In the First Amendment, for example, what force should be given to the term
"abridged"? In its natural sense, the word seems to mean "limited." Could one
make a serious argument to the effect that it is unconstitutional to limit speech
but clearly constitutional to deny it altogether? After all, the Fifteenth Amendment tells us that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or any State on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude." 6 And the Nineteenth Amendment uses the
"denied or abridged" language with respect to sex.7 It would be clearly preposterous to argue that the abundance of caution found in the Fifteenth and Nineteenth
Amendments should be read back into the First Amendment to say that limitations on speech are impermissible but total evisceration of speech rights is
acceptable. That interpretation makes no sense because it licenses massive
government evasions of the basic constitutional prohibition while sanctioning
lesser violations. It invites the government to magnify the scope of its wrong to
escape constitutional scrutiny. The whole point of the use of a general word like
"abridge" is that it does not limit the scope of the constitutional protection by
targeting one form of government action to the exclusion of another.
So how ought the Speech Clause to be read? First, we should not care what
particular device Congress uses to strike at the freedom of speech. Legislation
that creates civil liability, or forfeiture, or fines, or incarceration, or taxation, or
regulation can all in principle abridge the freedom of speech so that none can be

4. U.S.
5. U.S.

CONST.
CONST.
6. U.S. CONST.
7. U.S. CONST.

amend.
amend.
amend.
amend.

I.
V.
XV, § 1.
XIX.
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simply ruled beyond the Amendment's reach. Likewise, there is a genuine
question of whether speech includes only speaking or whether it covers writing,
drawing, painting, acting, or even (nude) dancing. 8 On these matters we should
again take the same position. All of these forms of expression are so similar to
the core protection that it hardly makes sense that the Congress must allow
everyone to speak his piece from behind a podium but not from a stage. And no
one would want to argue, I hope, that the free speech protections contemplated
by the Framers do not cover information that is transferred by telephone or the
Internet because those technologies were unknown in 1791.
These conclusions seem to me to be defensible by looking at a combination
of text and structure. I see no reason to think that judicial activism is a
precondition for reaching these results. I would regard it as a clear dereliction of
judicial duty to invoke some supposed shortfall of institutional competence to
thwart this application of constitutional principles. The knowledge that we can
glean from the text is sufficient, at least in the cases presented, to avoid casting
our interpretive lot with either judicial activism or judicial restraint.
But what about the similar protection of private property under the Fifth
Amendment? The same attitude of interpretation applies; we must begin with
the basic question of coverage. What constitutes a "taking" of private property?
It is easy to understand that the removal of property from the possession of the
individual into the hands of the state is a taking. But what of the concern that
government will resort to close substitutes? Certainly, this risk is as real with
the Fifth Amendment as it is with the First Amendment. Suppose a high federal
official ordered government troops to blow up a private home and then compensated the property owner for the value of the land, less the cost of removing the
rubble. Does anyone doubt that this should be treated as though the land were
taken first and "improved" by the government thereafter? The sequence of
events cannot under any sensible view determine the scope of the state obligation. Blow-up-then-take, or take-then-blow-up must both yield the same result.
I see no obvious constraint on this line of argument; it is difficult to see how
some actions directed toward the owner's possession, use, and disposition of
property fall within the scope of the Takings Clause, while others fall outside of
it. The same animating principle that applies to the First Amendment applies here.
The scope of constitutional protection would be paltry indeed if close substitutes to primafacie textual constitutional violations escaped scrutiny. To further
illustrate, suppose that the government did not blow up the property, but only
told its owner he was not allowed to use it as he wished but may hold it only as
a nature preserve. Or suppose that the property owner is not allowed to enter the
property, but some private third party is, as occurs under rent control statutes
with holdover tenants. Can one really argue that the property is not taken when
the owner is excluded even if the government does not enter? Even if the
8. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972).
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government does not enter, is not property taken when the government guarantees that some third person cannot be displaced when his property interest has
expired? Here, as with the First Amendment, reason and analogy are needed to
guard against legislative evasion, wholly without any appeal to judicial activism.
Once we start down this path, there is no principled limit to how far we go.
Any effort by the government to regulate, restrict, or tax the occupation, use, or
disposition of private property is equivalent to a taking of some fraction thereof.
The private law of property recognizes limited interests such as easements,
covenants, profits, leases, and life estates. Most forms of so-called land use
regulation are really state efforts to obtain one of these partial interests in real
property without compensation. Clearly, no landowner can compel his neighbor,
as a matter of right, to abstain from building on his own land (or near to the
common boundary, or above a certain height) without cause or contract. Why
then can the landowner enlist the state to gain that advantage for him without
having to pay a cent for the privilege? Encouraging the massing of state power
for private factional advantage in this matter will be the source of great political
mischief. The requirement of just compensation for these takings prevents the
dangerous slide down to the base aggrandizement of public power, for it
restores the parity between public and private initiatives. Just as with the First
Amendment, it is hard to imagine any taxation or regulation that is so privileged
as to escape scrutiny under the Takings Clause, without ever mounting the horse
of judicial activism.
A common response to this conundrum is an argument that rights are not
absolute. Justice Holmes has reminded us more than we care to hear that "[t]he
most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic." 9 It seems clear that some concern
with public safety and order preclude a misrepresentation of fact that may incur
suffering and personal injury. Once again, as with the basic coverage of the First
Amendment, this one seed gives rise to a luxurious doctrinal thicket. The
private law that protects the freedom of action generally is not absolute in
substance. There are all sorts of justifications for the limitation of what would
otherwise count as a primafacie right, and that is true under the Constitution as
well. The very use of the word "freedom" before speech carries with it the
unmistakable conclusion that what is protected under the First Amendment is a
conception of the freedom of speech, not some view that all speech must be free
of adverse legal consequence.
So from there it is off to the races. Next it becomes necessary to decide when
speech amounts to an incitement to riot. (After all, one person can be held
responsible in tort law for authorizing or encouraging another individual to
harm a hapless stranger.) From there it is a short walk to begin thinking about
other conspiracies and combinations, be they for insurrection, for smuggling, or
9. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
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for cartelization. There is not a word in the Constitution that speaks to the role
of the police power in the face of individual protection of rights, but no believer
in the Constitution can defend the view that the proper scope of the police
power is disembodied from the Constitution. It is a meticulous effort to figure
out when concerns with defamation, with privacy, with fraud, with solicitation,
with advertising, with public nuisances, justify the limitation of free speech.
The structure of the Constitution requires us to consider issues for which there
is no explicit textual guidance, but for which our society has imperative need. It
is no accident that the major nineteenth-century treatises on constitutional law
contained references to the use and limitations of police power in the title.1 ° But
the need for limitations on basic constitutional rights does not follow from a
theory of judicial restraint any more than the broad reading of the basic
coverage provisions followed from a belief in judicial activism. It is text,
structure, and function that point to broad constructions on both fronts.
The same argument again applies with respect to the Takings Clause. There is
no reason to think that the First Amendment does not protect against the creation of a
public nuisance but that the Takings Clause requires compensation for those
who commit a public nuisance, such as polluting public waters. This opens the
door to even more questions. For example, the concern with force and fraud
give rise to comprehensive justifications for everything from the regulation of
fireworks to the control of toxic medicines. William Novak has written eloquently in The People's Welfare" on the range of regulation that was routinely
sustained in the so-called golden age of laissez-faire. He speaks in successive
chapters of the regulation of fire, the well-ordered market, public spaces, disorderly
houses, demon rum, noxious trades, and medical police. Robert W. Gordon's
jacket blurb celebrates Novak's book because it "blasts to pieces the surprisingly hardly myth of laissez-faire, the libertarian fantasy that until the twentieth
century the American state left private property owners and entrepreneurs alone."12
Fortunately, Novak's book does nothing of the kind. Far from blasting
laissez-faire, it supports the more reasoned conclusion that nineteenth century
judges (including those in Lochner) worked very hard within the confines of the
police power to figure out which activities should have been regulated and
which not. It is only the parody of libertarian theory that holds that no form of
regulation is appropriate. Think about each of Novak's categories mentioned
above, and the force of the basic point becomes clear. Fire of course was a
common danger on the one hand and a common law tort on the other. It would
be odd to hold that the state could hold someone responsible for starting a fire in

supra note 1. See also ERNST FREUND, THE POLICE POWER, PUBLIC POLICY AND
(1904); CHRISTOPHER GUSTAVUS TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF THE
POLICE POWER IN THE UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND A CRIMINAL STANDPOINT (1886).
11. WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE'S WELFARE: LAW AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH CENTURY
AMERICA (1996).
12. Id. Back cover.
10. See

GILLMAN,

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
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tort but could not regulate to see that this same fire did not start or spread.
Economic regulation is not outside the scope of the police power either. It
seems sensible to allow the state to condemn land for use as a railroad. It may
well make sense for the state to require all noxious firms to work within a given
locale to control the risks of contagion.' 3 And as Justice Peckham, author of
Lochner, recognized, antitrust laws fall within the police power to the extent
that they
4
are intended to limit the consequences of private monopolies and cartels.'
Many cases point to exactly the opposite of what Gordon contends. Given the
historical scope of the police power, the hard question is why modem writers
revel in its decline when it seemed to represent an honest and intelligent effort
to draw the line between public-regarding and class-regulating legislation.
Earlier cases did recognize the ability of the state to regulate, even though they
rightly rejected the effort of the state to impose "labor statutes," which were in
fact class regulation designed to limit the ability of nonunion workers to
compete with union workers.' 5 The reasonable view of the police power in the
pre-1937 cases was in fact narrower than the "Open Sesame!" view of that
power in the modem cases. In modem cases, anything that looks like a
"compelling state interest" passes muster, even if the regulations in question
prop up monopolies and stifle competition. 16
We now come to the final critical point. Today we have police power
regulation under both the First and the Fifth Amendments. Yet why do we have
a narrow account of the police power for the First Amendment and unbridled
police power under the Fifth Amendment? To expand, under the First Amendment we really do care whether regulation of force and fraud are directed solely
at their proper objects, and whether the state is using reasonable means to
achieve that object. In contrast, under the Fifth Amendment none of these
restrictions apply, and use and economic regulation are freely used for the most
indefensible of partisan purposes under the latter Amendment.
The point here is that once we go back to basic theory, we do not have to
worry about an arid dispute between judicial activism and judicial restraint. We
simply have to make sure that we do not give expansive interpretations only to
clauses of the constitution that we as judges and scholars "like" while consigning those provisions that we do not like to some constitutional netherworld. The
real vice is inconsistent and opportunistic interpretation that lurches from one
extreme to another. The debate would be far better advanced if we junked labels
and debated principles of constitutional interpretation solely on their merits.

13. Concerns over quarantining noxious trades were far more prevalent in the nineteenth century
than they are today. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW: 1836-1937 at 118-20
(1991) (reexamining the famous Slaughter-House Cases).
14. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 66-67 (1905).
15. This was the gist of the Peckham position in Lochner. See id.
16. See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (allowing price regulation for competitive
industry).
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